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The phrase "ethics as first phi losophy" is most identified with 
Emmanuel Levinas. It is the idea, put simply, that what has been 
traditionally looked to as first philosophy, usually epis temology 
or metaphysics , is not first in any sense at all. Rather, all such 
posit ions are dependent on a precedent ethics . Thus , ethics be-
comes first philosophy. In my investigation of the concept here , I 
intend to place it in a broader context of Continental phi losophy, 
identifying the threads of Continental thought that inform the con-
cept, both within and outside the limits of the phenomenologica l , 
and primari ly through the lens of the influential p redecessors 
Nietzsche and Heidegger. In this way I hope to provide a deeper 
understanding of the concept and possibly a broader defense of its 
validity. 
First Philosophy: 
The Concept, The Tradition 
The logic of a first philosophy suggests a starting point, a defi-
nite beginning, a "getting to the bottom of things, seeing things 
whole and c lear" (Page xii), a secure foundation. Foundat ion, yes , 
I like that. Philosophy abounds with building metaphors : founda-
t i o n s , l a d d e r s , b r i c k s , s c a f f o l d i n g , c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m , 
deconstruct ionism, boards, planks, nails. . . Such building meta-
phors allow philosophers to explicate a world or system that is 
made up of parts that are interdependent, job-specific and hierar-
chically posed. That is, certain parts are conceived as more impor-
tant than others for they maintain the structure of the building. 
Whi le other, more trivial parts, provide only ancillary support or 
even mere decoration. Without the "foundat ion" of the more im-
portant parts, the more trivial parts would have no purpose and 
would indeed fall in on themselves. 
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The logic of first philosophy employs this manner of meta-
phor to elucidate a hierarchical ontology in which a foundation is 
necessary to support all derivative thought (i.e. ancillary support 
and decoration). Traditionally, this foundation has been established 
in the realm of metaphysics or epistemology, where clear logic 
and fixed, static reality converge, allowing the perspicacious phi -
losopher to see things "whole and clear." Metaphysics , the estab-
lishment of fixed, unchanging stuff, substance, ousia, ideas , etc. , 
provides a concrete, unshifting basis on which to build further re-
ality. Epis temology, the establ ishment of cogni t ive ca tegor ies 
through which the structure of the world is taken in and under-
stood, provides the window (without or potentially without refrac-
tion) through which basic foundational knowledge is attained and 
maintained. Once these are established, other forms of knowledge , 
forms of philosophy, can be sought and justified. These are the 
parts of the building that provide ancillary support and decorat ion: 
political philosophy, ethics, aesthetics. Traditionally, these areas 
of philosophy have been somewhat marginalized, seen as less real, 
less important, more trivial. Sometimes they are conceived as ut-
terly distinct from those most real areas of philosophy and some-
times utterly dependent on them for arguments and justification 
and ultimately for their very being. 
Descartes is well known for his search for a first phi losophy, 
one that would dispel all doubt and concretize certain knowledge . 
Having doubted the entire world out of existence, he then es tab-
lished the one piece of knowledge that could not be doubted away: 
the cogito. From there with the help of his version of the ontologi-
cal argument, he re-established the existence of God and from there 
repopulated the world. Not until the epistemological basis of one 
bit of certain knowledge and the metaphysical foundation of the 
world are established can life go on. Not until then can we know if 
anything we do has any meaning. Not until then can we be sure 
any decision we make is correct. Not until then can we be sure 
what direction to take in any aspect of life. Because not until then 
can we know for sure what ' s real and what ' s not. Not until then 
can we know that our perception is clear. 
Plato too is known for his search for knowledge that will act as 
support for further, derivative knowledge. Pla to ' s inspiration for 
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this search was a response to the relativism of the sophists . He 
delved into metaphysics and epistemology in order to argue the 
objective moral claims of Socrates. In this way, for Plato, meta-
physics and epistemology precede ethics, provide support and jus -
tification for ethical claims, turn superficial values into facts. With-
out good reason and the support of knowable reality behind it, 
ethics is blind and confused. 
Kant also worked hard to transpose values into facts. Both The 
Metaphysics of Morals and The Critique of Practical Reason es-
tablish an ethics based on rational arguments that follow from his 
studies in metaphysics and epistemology. For Kant , like Plato, eth-
ics could not stand alone. Without the proper foundation it could 
only shift, slip and slide until it fell in on itself. 
This quest for certain knowledge has become a longstanding 
tradition or even obligation in Western philosophy. However , the 
late modern era (or "pos tmodern" era) has t ime and again ques-
tioned the efficacy of such a quest, problematized the assumption 
of the clear reception of such knowledge, genealogically explored 
the motivation behind such a quest and critiqued the presumption 
of an obligation for such a quest. In the U.S . such attacks can be 
found in James ian pragmat ism, Deweyan ins t rumental ism and 
Ror tyan i rony. In Europe s imilar a t tacks have been m a d e by 
Nietzschean perspectiv ism, late Wittgensteinian ordinary language 
theory, Heidegger ian hermeneut ics , Lyo ta rd ' s pos tmodern i sm, 
Derridean deconstructionism and Foucaultian rapports depouvoir. 
This is not to say that the quest for objective knowledge has com-
pletely vanished from the philosophical landscape. This quest is 
still alive for many Anglo-American philosophers and Cont inen-
tal philosophers as well. And even for some of the critics alluded 
to above (as well as the countless others who flank them) objec-
tive knowledge is often a concern as they fight the diametric " d e -
m o n " of relativism. For even some of the most radical phi loso-
phers today relativism will not be permitted or admitted. That is, 
either they will not allow themselves to head in that direction or 
they will not admit the fact, obvious to everyone else, that the 
direction their thought points, inevitably and ineluctably toward, 
is relativism. The problem is that relativism brings with it the risk 
of the loss of any kind of assurance, including (or perhaps , espe-
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da i l y ) normative assurance. And without normativity the ethico-
political stance of political and politically active philosophers like 
Dewey, Wittgenstein, Rorty, Derrida and Foucault cannot be de -
fended. And historical horrors such as the Holocaust and African 
slave trade cannot be reviled and may well occur again. And cer-
tainly the problem of Heidegger brings this concern to life. 
Conceptual Adjustment: 
First Philosophy, Ethics 
The traditional definitions of both first philosophy and ethics 
will not work here. T o apply to such a project, a reasonable adjust-
ment needs to be made for each. Certainly, with the loss of foun-
dational knowledge already admitted (and accepted, affirmed, cel-
ebrated), first philosophy can no longer mean "gett ing to the bot-
tom of things, seeing things whole and clear" (Page xii). If we 
return to the building metaphor and extend it a bit, we realize that 
any foundation itself must be built. A foundation is not merely a 
found piece of firm ground. It is dug in, laid, and built up. "Wi th -
out a secure foundation a building will col lapse" is a true state-
ment. But "Without a well-built foundation a building will col-
lapse" is more accurate. Before construction the placement of a 
foundation has to be chosen (for geological, geographical and de-
mographic reasons). The forces that the planned building will ex-
ert must be calculated. And the foundation must be dug into that 
chosen ground and adequate building materials (br icks, c inder 
blocks, cement—which are the actual foundation) must be laid 
according to the calculations of exerted force. Applying this anal-
ogy to foundational knowledge or first philosophy, then, a so-called 
first philosophy must be chosen for identifiable (even mundane) 
reasons and enforced to withstand expected stress. There is a cer-
tain sense in which it is obviously very contingent. Another build-
ing site could have been chosen. The expected stressors could have 
been different, thereby changing the manner of laying the founda-
tion. So, though it might sound contrary, any notion of "first phi-
losophy" I use must include a sense of contingency. And the foun-
dation of foundational knowledge is secure but not so secure that 
it could never be torn up. This fact, however, both in construction 
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and in phi losophy, does not mean that the building is useless. It 
can serve a function—any number of functions. But this fact does 
recognize that the building does serve a number of specific, in-
tended functions. That is, there are specific purposes precedent to 
the laying of a foundation. In this way first philosophy is under-
stood as not universalizable and non-contingent but as simply pre-
cedent to other, further studies and directive toward certain, in-
tended goals. 
The use of the term ethics I wish to suggest here is not a s imple 
matter at all. Traditional definitions concern an analysis of good 
and bad, the search for the good life. And I do not wish to com-
pletely abrogate these approaches. But I want to expand the con-
ception of ethics in two directions: 1) to include those trivial as-
pects of life and behavior not usually recognized as important 
enough to be considered ethical matters. Traditionally the name 
ethics has been reserved for the grand questions of life and con-
duct: sexuali ty, death (murder, suicide, abort ion, self-defense), 
just ice, polit ics, the general and ultimate direction of o n e ' s life. 
But I wish to include (indeed, emphasize) all manner of activity 
and every trivial decision. Accordingly, the way one dresses is 
implicated in ethics. The music one listens to is an ethical concern. 
So is the car one drives. So is where one eats breakfast: whether at 
the local, trendy cafe/bookstore, an old—fashioned coffee shop, 
McDona ld ' s , one ' s own kitchen, or even sitting in bed eat ing dry 
Froot Loops out of the box while watching McMillan and Wife 
reruns. 2) The other direction is the opposite direction. Ethics ex-
pands to include not only the so-called "grand ques t ions" of life 
but what lies behind those "grand quest ions": the reasoning pro-
cess upon which any answer might be based, the motivation for 
making those quest ions "grand quest ions," etc. For a more con-
crete (though admittedly contingent and revisable) definition, I pro-
pose: an amorphous set of often undifferentiated beliefs, thoughts , 
practices and knowledge that order both individual and collective 
life, and which is both inherited through enculturation and causa 
sui in the sense of being transformed through practice. This defini-
tion first establishes that ethics is not a fixed entity by including 
amorphousness as one of its qualities. It also breaks down the cog-
nitive/noncognitive distinction by admitting that the distinction be-
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tween beliefs, thoughts, practices and knowledge can often be vague 
and even undifferentiated, or at least difficult to differentiate. The 
definition includes both personal and public conduct . Further, the 
definition admits a cultural/historical perspective in being inher-
ited as well as a creative aspect in admitting that change occurs 
through the very practice of ethics. Also, the definition is consis-
tent with and probably influenced by Foucaul t ' s understanding of 
Greek ethics: "a way of being and of behavior . . .a mode of being 
of the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way visible to 
others. A person ' s ethos was evident in his clothing, appearance, 
gait, in the calm with which he responded to every event, and so 
o n " (Foucault 286). 
Nietzsche 
Nietzsche 's contributions to the understanding of this issue lie 
primarily in his genealogy, his Will to Power, his perspect ivism, 
and his overriding sense and valuation of creativity. Nie tzsche ' s 
genealogy taught us that even the most seemingly natural of prac-
tices has a contingent history. Morals, and all the aspects of mor-
als (guilt, compassion, good, evil) are understood then not as natu-
ral entities but as historical phenomena. In this way he deflates 
the English moralists, whose "heaving breasts seem to them the 
be l lows of g o d l i n e s s . . . " (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 232 ) . 
Nie tzsche ' s Will to Power strips ethical thought of all extrava-
gance. Sentimental prejudices are tossed aside. Overwrought 
proofs are destroyed. What is left is the simple d ichotomy of life 
affirmation/life denial. Nietzsche 's perspectivism allows a com-
plete explanation of genealogical study. The multiple directions 
that ideas and beliefs take are explained through the multiplicity 
of perspectives. Nietzsche powerfully explains, "There is only a 
perspective of seeing, only a perspective of ' k n o w i n g ' . . . t o el imi-
nate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, suppos-
ing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to cas-
trate the intellect" (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 119). 
So perspectival knowledge is not only admitted but required. The 
admittance of perspective legitimizes different ways of being, think-
ing, believing rather than holding the Parmenidean charge that only 
ETHICS AS FIRST PHILOSOPHY 205 
one way can be the way that " i s . " Finally, the Nietzschean sense 
of creativity reinforces the affirmation of life, refuses the impo-
tence of ascesis, and, while assured by perspectivism, reflexively 
increases the multiplicity of perspectives. 
Nietzsche is the great destroyer, the great leveller. He wields 
his hammer with equal destructive force against all foes, all insti-
tutions, all philosophies, all moralities, all metaphysics . Many phi-
losophers (every worthwhile philosopher to some degree) have 
destroyed, critiqued, destabilized that which came before them. 
But none before or since have done so with the vigor, the relish, 
the relentless, unforgiving aggression of Nietzsche. Never before 
or since has such an attack been leveled against the prejudices, the 
status quo , the unquestioned, entrenched, static beliefs and pre-
sumptions of Western thought. Nietzsche pulled phi losophy from 
the clouds of esoteric and transcendental intellect down to the real 
world of life and filth and raw power, of bodies and urges and low 
beginnings: "Behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of move-
ment, too, there stand valuations, or, more clearly, physiological 
demands for the preservation of a certain type of life" (Nietzsche, 
Beyond Good and Evil 11). This aspect of Nie tzsche ' s thought 
establishes the reality and potential moral evaluation of the naked, 
immediate world which surrounds us: a world of ubiquitous con-
flict, filthy, animalistic bodies and messy, overflowing discharge. 
What I am suggesting here is an important ontological point. Just 
as Plato established the reality of forms—as perfect, eternal , un-
changing—and worked downward from there ontologically, d i -
vesting the physical world of significant reality, Nietzsche begins 
ontologically with that which is lowly (the hair, mud , and dirt that 
Socrates curled his pug-nose at), investing primary reality there 
and demonstra t ing that all, supposedly higher, forms of being, 
knowledge, reality are somehow (usually with a marked sense of 
artificiality) built upon these. And since Plato the relationship be-
tween ethics and ontology has been, if not fully understood, at 
least apparent. That which is real (unchanging, eternal, "perfect") , 
that which is ontologically prime and prior, is ethically pr ime. So , 
too, with Nietzsche the dust into which universals, substances and 
essences are pounded is blown away like so much insubstantial 
powder. 
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What follows is that the motivation behind any thought or logic 
and the direction it takes is not some high-minded pursuit of that 
which is unbiased, objective, true, but something very biased, sub-
jective (or perspectival) and instinctive: " the preservation of a cer-
tain type of life." Again, here we are reduced to the lowly constitu-
ents of being, the mere perpetuation of life, which includes all that 
is agonistic, bloody, selfish and thrusting. 
Not only does "the preservation of a certain type of l ife" in-
clude all that is bloody and selfish, but it also suggests a very spe-
cific, even narrow, direction and perspective for thought. This is a 
perspective that, of course, works toward itself, its own survival. It 
is selfish and autonomous in the true meaning of the word: self-
law-giving. T o do otherwise would mean death, extinction. And 
life would cancel itself out. So any logic is an attempt to perpetu-
ate oneself. T o think otherwise would be self-defeating. T o think 
other/wise would be self-defeating. In this sense the other becomes 
the enemy as the self struggles for its own survival. But this is to a 
certain extent a necessary process. Only three possible perspec-
tives present themselves: the perspective of the self, the other, and 
God or eternity—that is, the perspective of all perspectives or the 
Perspective without perspective. The perspective of the other pre-
sents an inherent danger. And the perspective of eternity is really 
no perspective. It is without will, without t ime, without life. What 
Nietzsche affirms and celebrates is our own limited perspective, 
for it is its very limits that gives it meaning. "There is only a per-
spective of seeing, only a perspective of ' k n o w i n g ' . . . But to el imi-
nate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, suppos-
ing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to castrate 
the intellect? "(Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 119). "Cas-
trate the intellect," a very powerful, telling metaphor that brings 
home the lowly beginnings and selfish, carnal motivat ions of the 
highest thoughts. 
This perspectivism of Nietzsche 's leads to a quest ioning and 
possible understanding of the Other. Note again the quote from 
Beyond Good and Evil I cited earlier. The whole paragraph reads: 
Behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of 
movement , too, there stand valuations or, more 
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clearly, physiological demands for a certain type 
of life. For example , that the definite should be 
worth more than the indefinite, and mere appear-
ance wor th less than " t r u t h " — s u c h e s t ima te s 
might be, in spite of their regulative importance 
for us, nevertheless mere foreground est imates, a 
certain kind of niaiserie which may be necessary 
for the preservation of just such beings as we are. 
Supposing, that is, that not just man is the "mea -
sure of th ings" (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 
11). 
The reference to Protagoras at the end presents what appears to be 
a surprising attack on relativism, considering the relativistic slant 
of the rest of the paragraph. But it is a very telling and important 
remark. It is not at heart any kind of critique of relativism or sup-
port for objectivism. What Nietzsche is pointing to by quest ioning 
man as " the measure of th ings" is man as a static limit. " M a n " for 
Nietzsche is a decentered focus. Kant set " m a n " up as the some-
what passive lens through which knowledge of the world is gained/ 
constructed. As such " m a n " for Kant stands still. But for Nietzsche 
man is not the "measure of th ings" for I) man himself is con-
structed knowledge and 2) man can always be more than he is. 
Man is decentered. The suggestion is that there is something be-
yond man, that there are things of no importance for our preserva-
tion that we neither value, recognize nor even see, but that exist 
nonetheless. Of course the existence of that which is outside our 
purview is an old and even cliched problem in philosophy. Aristotle 
ridiculed P la to ' s redoubling of this world. Berkeley maintained 
the existence of that which is not perceived by naming God as the 
great perceiver. But in this case, rather than a concern over physi-
cal objects blinking in and out of existence, what we have is an 
expression of perspectivism and the relation of the other. The other 
a lways has a different perspective and always constructs reality 
differently. 
By capitalizing on the sexist language both Nietzsche and I 
have been using up till now, we can develop this line of thought in 
a concrete manner by interpreting the other as woman , and by un-
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derstanding a different perspective, a different reality surrounding 
women. Recognizing this different perspective, this different "mea-
sure of things," we understand the status of even our most impor-
tant world-forming ideas as "mere foreground es t imates ." This 
recognition of the other does two things. First, it decenters man as 
the single lens through which reality is perceived and understood. 
Second, it points out the contingency of the perspective of man 
and the possibility to change (expand, decrease, skew) that per-
spective so that man is not "the measure of th ings" and the possi-
bilities of being open up. 
Of course this post-feminist interpretation of Nietzsche might 
be considered ex post facto or anachronistic, but I think it clarifies, 
from a contemporary viewpoint, what Nietzsche was getting at: 
the contingency, motivations, and limited perspective of any valu-
ation. And, as we saw earlier, this limited perspective is necessary 
in order to give the intellect a direction. Or, to take the castration 
metaphor further, this limited perspective is necessary to give the 
intellect power and vitality and virility. 
But also in evaluation of the appropriateness of the crit ico-
feminist interpretation, another important, highly complex issue 
arises. When we speak of the " u s " that is facing the other, whom 
exactly are we speaking of? Are we speaking of " m a n , " "human-
ity," "white men ," "middle-aged heterosexual white men"? Could 
we perhaps even be speaking of an individual? When this question 
arises, the issue then takes on a more traditional, familiar face: 
egoism. Of course egoism (psychological, ethical) is traditionally 
understood as attributable to individuals. It is the primary concern 
for oneself (as subject and/or object) in all matters of choice. It is 
a position which has had its share of supporters but many , many 
critics as well. But if we try to understand Nie tzsche ' s position in 
terms of egoism, we breakdown the barrier that limits the attribu-
tion of egoism to the individual and resolve or nullify many of the 
traditional critiques of egoism. Hence, the "egoistic subject" be-
comes an open question attributable to any indefinite group that 
can be shown to have its own selfish interests. And this group 
chooses for itself (for its own survival) often in competi t ion with 
other groups, often in competition with other groups whose m e m -
bers may include some of the first g roup ' s members . In this way 
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individual members acquire fractured loyalties which may or may 
not be problematic , depending on the nature of the various m e m -
berships, the needs of the individual, and the nature of the groups 
themselves. Conflict and competit ion further arise when different 
groups override one another when a hierarchical order ensues . 
What we have here is a kaleidoscope of compet ing perspec-
tives. The perspectives that win (any victory is only ever t empo-
rary) take on the status of "faith," the unquestioned justification. 
And from this faith science acquires "a direction, a limit, a method, 
a right to exis t" (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 152). 
The language of Nietzsche here is very important. It recalls the 
position that cognit ive perspective is not only a fact but a neces-
sary fact. The science through which we view, understand and 
analyze our world is justified (has "a right to exist") not simply 
because it is true (which would here be only a first-level, superfi-
cial justification) but because the battle of perspectives (which is 
really a battle of wills to life) has established not only the need for 
a perspective cum faith cum science but a need for that particular 
perspective-faith-science in order to answer the "physiological de -
mands of a certain type of life." This right, then, based on what 
exists in the world of facticity dissolves the is/ought distinction. 
This right, this justification is not (and need not be) based on ob -
ject ive , ahistorical criteria but on "physiological d e m a n d s , " on 
flesh. Decadent though it may be, it is a real enough, stable enough, 
objective enough standard to justify science, metaphysics, etc. Flesh 
incarnate, which philosophy has so long abjured, is what deter-
mines such directions and motivations. Flesh incarnate is what 
makes the face of the other important, a force to be dealt with and 
the beginning of understanding. 
Heidegger 
In order to further our understanding of "e th ics" here, con-
sider the etymological reading which Heidegger brings to the word 
as that "which ponders the abode of m a n " (Heidegger 235) . The 
metaphor of ethics as an abode, a house, a dwell ing, a place for 
living, I find very instructive. It provides a spatial sensibility that 
leads to the connection between ethics and ontology that Heidegger 
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sought to explore and that I do as well. For I believe that it is with 
this connection that we will understand what sort of obligations 
ethics inculcates and why. However, what I find puzzling, myste-
rious and ultimately of no use from my point of view is this idea of 
"Be ing" with a capital " B " and originary ethics, nor do I have any 
idea what an originary ethics would consist of. Origins seem too 
distant to me. I can only relate to being with a lower-case " b . " This 
"be ing" is (or can be) immanent, full, rich and factical. I person-
ally feel no primordial connection to Being, nor do I have any 
confidence in the possibility of discovering an originary ethics. As 
Jack Caputo so pithily expressed it: "Though I wait daily by my 
phone , though I keep my ear close to the ground, I cannot , for the 
life of me , hear the call of Being" (Caputo 12). But the onto-
ethical sense that ethos/abode suggests, I find very instructive. 
In Heidegger 's "Letter on Humanism" he etymologically stud-
ies the word ethics, finding the Greek root, ethos, of part icular 
interest and much fuller and more original than the narrow field of 
"e th ics" introduced by Plato and developed by Aristotle. The more 
interesting term ethos, says Heidegger, "means abode, dwell ing 
place." And Heidegger continues, "The word names the open re-
gion in which man dwells . The open region of his abode al lows 
what pertains to m a n ' s essence, and what in thus arriving resides 
in nearness to him, to appear. The abode of man contains and pre-
serves the advent to what belongs to man in his essence" (Heidegger 
233). This etymological analysis, I think is t remendously impor-
tant to understanding what ethics means and retrieving that mean-
ing from the parochial clutches of moral philosophers who, even 
one hundred years after Nietzsche, are hung up with a determinate 
sense of right and wrong, good and evil. However , I find myself at 
odds with Heidegger ' s further development of this notion of abode 
as "originary e thics" which will reconnect man with Being, the 
primordial element of man. First of all, I know not what " true Be-
ing" would be and know not how one would study or establish 
such a thing. Secondly, the decadent character of flesh makes any 
putative knowledge of origin of dubious value. 
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Levinas 
Abode , nonetheless , is a fabulously instructive metaphor , and 
I do follow Heidegger in this respect to a point. And where I break 
from Heidegger I find Levinas ' interpretation of dwell ing much 
more on track. In Levinas the dwelling, the abode loses that search 
for what is original and true. For Levinas, man has not lost touch 
with Being, but his being is defined by that ethos or abode which 
centers, delimits and nurtures his ontic, cognitive and epis temo-
logical life: "The privileged role of the home does not consist in 
being the end of human activity but in being its condit ion, and in 
this sense its commencemen t" (Levinas 152). There is a sense of 
the abode being an origin in Levinas as well but not a final origin 
that points to true Being, merely the condition of being as i t ' s un-
derstood both as within any contemporary context and as defined 
less by metaphysical existence than by activity. 
What in Heidegger that is retained is this notion of what per-
tains to m a n ' s essence residing near to him and the abode contain-
ing and preserving "what belongs to man in his essence ." The 
verb "be longs" is very important here, for possession of one ' s be-
ing, one ' s world is the very definition of having a being, a world: 
"Possession masters , suspends, postpones the unforeseeable fu-
ture of the element—its independence, its be ing" (Levinas 158). 
"Possession posits the product of labor as what remains perma-
nent in t ime, a substance" (Levinas 160). An odd parallel exists 
between this metaphorical use of labor and possession and Locke ' s 
literal use as the apples of the orchard becomes o n e ' s own (one ' s 
possessions) once one ' s labor is added to them through the pick-
ing of the fruit. Just so, the labor of constructing o n e ' s home , bring-
ing objects within it, makes the world one ' s possession. So there is 
constituted both a within and a without, the without being that 
measure which Nietzsche suggests, is beyond "man as the mea-
sure ." 
What is within is the world that is one ' s life, o n e ' s onticity 
(ontology?), one ' s being: "The primordial function of the home 
does not consist in orienting being by the architecture of the build-
ing and in discovering a site, but in breaking the plenum of the 
element, in opening in it the Utopia in which the T recollects itself 
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in dwell ing the latent birth of the world is p roduced" (Levinas 
156). This is a world (a home) of things and beings all possessed 
through taking and comprehending (prend et comprend). What is 
in the home, "near the body is possessed, is intentionality of con-
cretization" (Levinas 153). What is outside the home is the alterity 
of a different, world, a different home, the Other. What is other is 
indifferent, malevolent or simply unknowable to one ' s home. Thus 
what sustains and perpetuates one and one ' s home is valued, the 
"physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of 
life." Or, in the words of Levinas echoing Nietzsche: "Wha t is 
necessary to my existence in order to subsist interests my exist-
e n c e " (Levinas 164). What is outside, if indifferent or unknow-
able is ignored, if malevolent (or perceived as malevolent), is feared, 
hated, attacked. For it is not outside of one ' s world that the rela-
tionship with the Other is produced but within that world and in 
the very act of putting that world in question. The mere valuation 
of truth over falsity, the definite over the indefinite, stasis over 
change, objective knowledge over subjective knowledge reflect 
the valuations necessary for creatures such as us and thereby are 
justified on those somewhat contingent grounds. Further, it is valu-
ations such as these that construct our home, our world, our ontol-
ogy, and, foremost, our ethics. The manner in which we value what 
sustains us and how we construct our relationships to the Other 
forms an ethical field that is incarnated in the world that is our 
home. "Morali ty is not added to the preoccupations of the I, so as 
to order them or have them judged; it calls in question, and puts at 
a distance from itself, the I i t s e l f (Levinas 172). And, by putting 
the I in question, the I is given definition, a justification, a home 
and the direction, motivation and justification for all further thought 
and belief. 
But again we need to question this separation between the I 
(we?) and the Other. Where does this separation occur and how is 
it transcended? A simple, clear-cut distinction between I and Other 
would be difficult to defend, dangerous to maintain and ultimately 
solipsistic. 
What transcends these barriers, according to Levinas , is lan-
guage: "it is contact across a distance, relation with the non-touch-
able, across a void" (Levinas 172). Through generalization and 
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universalization language speaks the world to the Other, thereby 
instituting a common world and transcending the void between I 
and Other. In this way the barrier of that void is dissolved, if only 
partially, and the Other is no longer other, but a common " w e . " In 
this way any Other is potentially part of the world of " I . " The bar-
riers between I and Other are porous, non-absolute and subject to 
change. It follows from this that one ' s world, one ' s dwell ing, one ' s 
ontology, one ' s ethics is also non-absolute and subject to change . 
And it is this primordial recognition of the Other that is the first 
ethical event, and that provides the contingent background and 
forward direction and motivation for further thought and practice 
which is first philosophy. 
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University of Minnesota 
It was January of 1969 when Theodor Adorno called in the 
police to defend the Institute for Social Research from a student 
sit-in; at that point the contradictions of the Frankfurt Schoo l ' s 
Critical Theory project may have been at their rawest . Here , in the 
midst of what many saw as an international revolutionary moment , 
one of the very forefathers of the radical s tudents ' agenda was to 
intervene on the side of state power . For the student radicals , 
Adorno ' s stubborn position was that of a complacent grumbler , an 
armchair malcontent unwilling to face the risks of Critical Theory ' s 
actualization. But Adorno ' s contradictory — some would say com-
p r o m i s e d — position regarding the possibility of real social change 
requires a second look. 
His provocative response to the student movement — j u s t one 
of many moments of antagonism with the restless energies of the 
youthful left — is hardly incommensurable with his commitment 
to using thought to change the way things are. As he would point 
out in the 1969 essay "Resignat ion" (included in the recent vol-
ume Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, edited by 
Henry Pickford), those who would measure commitment by in-
dexing it to action fall prey to the very condit ions they seek to 
transform. The student radicals, he argued, valorized action over 
theory, their intolerance of reflective thought served to reproduce 
the repressive condit ions theory was meant to crit ique in the first 
place. 
Faced with a contradictory totality in which every act is cor-
rupted by the dictates of a ruthless capitalism, the student radicals, 
A d o m o claimed, were acting out of anxiety more than true com-
mitment to social change — their praxis was a substitutive satis-
faction born of helplessness in the face of an increasingly totalitar-
ian world. Not unlike the "keep busy" homilies proffered to mourn-
ful survivors of a recently deceased friend, their actions were vain 
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attempts to avoid confronting the immensity of a plight: as he put 
it, "one clings to action for the sake of the impossibility of ac t ion" 
(290). 
It is a testament to the rigorous consistency of A d o r n o ' s mate-
rialist dialectical thought that his criticisms of the student left ech-
oed those he had leveled at his nemeses for decades — A d o r n o ' s 
scorn for the self-important "pseudo-activi ty" of individuals un-
der modern capitalism knew few limits. Yet the impression of 
Adorno as a surly contrarian, with a frown as severe as his attitude 
was aloof, has of late been subjected to considerable revision. Bur-
geoning recent interest in America, fueled by Marxist literary critic 
Fredric Jameson ' s tireless championing of Adorno , and buoyed 
by Robert Hul lot -Kentor ' s stellar retranslation of the masterful 
Aesthetic Theory, means that the t ime is right for that reconsidera-
tion. 
As meditations on the predicament of the modern public intel-
lectual, these texts have their antecedent in the breathtaking Minima 
Moralia, a collection of aphorisms from the 1950s in which the 
extremes of Adorno ' s negative dialectical approach were brought 
to bear on the most intimate and mundane details of modern life, 
from marriage and divorce to driving a car. But while the focus in 
that book was generally the claustrophobic private sphere (where 
Adorno memorably suggests that the modern subject is inevitably 
condemned to the "shame of still having air to breathe, in hel l") , 
the later texts compiled here are of a surprisingly public stripe, in 
many cases based on the radio talks he made with great frequency 
in the two decades prior to his death, 
W h e t h e r conf ron t ing a par t icu la r ly vap id T V s i t com or 
Germany ' s holocaust legacy, Adorno insisted on a r igorous com-
mi tmen t to a brand of phi losophical c r i t ique j e o p a r d i z e d by 
capi tal ism's subjection of virtually every modern realm to the dic-
tates of standardization and conformity. Subtly threading his way 
between the twin dangers of apologetic submission to the status 
quo and arrogant faith in the infallibility of subjective agency, his 
conclusions are at once grim and Utopian. "Whoever puts forward 
proposals easily makes himself into an accompl ice ," he argues. 
" A purist attitude, however, that refrains from intervening, l ike-
wise reinforces that from which it t imorously recoi ls" (4) . Only in 
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thought could critique find a legitimate space from which to counter 
the overarching social tendencies. T o think autonomously , in con-
ditions bent on extirpating autonomous thought, is to resist. 
The very insatiability of a thought that seeks to think differ-
ently indicates, for Adorono, phi losophy 's continued relevance. In 
the book ' s opening essay, "Why Still Phi losophy?," he inveighs 
against the regnant models of thinking for their betrayal of the 
critical aspect that has defined philosophy from Xenophanes to 
Aristotle to Kant, Leibniz, Hegel, and Marx. Torn between what 
he sees as the one-dimensional rationality of logical positivism 
and the Heideggerian ontologies that regard conceptual labors as a 
mere obstacle to the unfolding of Being, " thinking becomes a nec-
essary evil and is broadly discredited" (9). Neutralized by its spe-
cia l iza t ion and d isc ip l inar iza t ion , ph i losophy has b e c o m e an 
insider 's sport preoccupied with reified method for me thod ' s sake, 
forgetting its social obligations and sacrificing its commitment to 
freedom. 
As in all of Adorno ' s work, the process of thinking — the 
machinery whereby reason can occasionally gl impse something 
like truth is expressed in the form of maddening reversals, im-
probable paradoxes, and sentences which syntactically lash back 
on themselves before imploding, leaving behind not stable con-
cepts but only the residual afterimages of concept-creation. Truth 
is a "constantly evolving constellat ion" (131) and thought a "non-
particularized pursui t" (6); the intersections between the two only 
emerge when the thinker gives him or herself over to the object 
with both respect and critical rigor. Thus does philosophy have to 
face that which is not identical to it, ceasing " to content itself with 
cogni t ions that are predictable and from which noth ing more 
emerges than what had been placed there beforehand" (128). 
Such a sentiment might apply just as much to those who wish 
to hastily judge Adorno as to those immersed in Heldeggmanism, 
Hegelian identity-thinking, or positivist apology Pickford 's col -
lection ably documents an Adorno in which critical cantankerous-
ness is harnessed to a belief in the political and philosophical sig-
nificance of everyday life. He is at t imes swashbuckl ing and iras-
cible, as in "Television as Ideology", where matter-of-fact sarcasm 
functions as critically as the dialectic it accompanies . But just as 
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readily does his rigor take the form of a melancholy determina-
tion; **I have exaggerated the somber side.. . ." he admits , in "The 
Meaning of Working Through the Past", a meditation on the stakes 
of Holocaust remembrance (the healing aspects of which he sug-
gests to be complicit with a desire to forget). 
Not content to sit back and lament phi losophy 's supposed ob-
solescence as a tool of social transformation, Adorno. in Critical 
Models directs his gaze outward, turning away from the ossified 
confines of philosophical method and toward an open future of 
improbable possibility. Unlike the students who so pilloried him 
in the 1960s, Adorno ' s demand is for a patient, composed and de-
liberate alertness to the outlines of that future, g l immering into 
perceptibility on a distant horizon. His refusal to provide quick 
and dirty satisfaction to the desire for change may appear to activ-
ist types as a philosophy content to run in unceasing dialectical 
circles, like a restless dog biting its own tail. Yet given A d o r n o ' s 
depiction of the stakes of thought in late capitalism, we should 
perhaps be thankful to his Critical Models for sustaining hope that 
philosophy can bite anything at all. 
